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Introduction 
In the developing world, especially, citizens are regularly presented with several 
different types of messages about corruption. In major cities it is not uncommon to see 
anticorruption billboards, posters, and murals. The prominence of these messages reflects the 
success of the anticorruption awareness-raising agenda. The agenda’s call, codified in Article 
13 of the 2004 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, instructs governments to “raise 
public awareness regarding the existence, causes and gravity of and the threat posed by 
corruption”.1 Now, most anticorruption programs contain an awareness-raising element. The 
media also propagates many of their own messages about corruption, of course. A simple 
search for news stories containing the word ‘corruption’ on Tempo online, a popular news 
source in Indonesia, returned 10,463 news items. By comparison, the same search for stories 
containing the word ‘economy’ returned only 6,475. 
Several things remain unclear about what effect, if any, different messages about 
corruption have. Of interest here is whether and to what extent different messages about 
corruption shape perceptions of the corruption environment. This is important because people 
act based on their expectations and beliefs, and so depending on whether and how they shape 
                                                          
1 United Nations 2004, 15. 
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perceptions, influential messages could be harnessed as a useful tool in the fight against 
corruption. 
Using data from an original survey experiment—conducted across 1,000 households in 
Jakarta—this research tests whether four messages about corruption influenced four types of 
perceptions. The results raise cause for concerns with respect to the efficacy of anticorruption 
awareness-raising. They show that even messages about successes the government has had in 
fighting corruption and how citizens can get involved in anticorruption activities can have 
negative, unintended influences on perceptions.  
Literature Review 
Experimental political psychology research has established that political messages can 
have significant influences on attitudes and behaviour.2 Messages can shape perceptions 
through at least three different mechanisms. Attitudes about an issue might shift because a 
message causes the exposed person to think more about the issue than they would have 
otherwise (priming). New information learned from a message might adjust perceptions too 
(learning). Finally, an exposed person could be persuaded to think differently about an issue—
for example, because the message was particularly emotive or because it was delivered by a 
member of a political group the exposed person is sympathetic to (persuasion).3  
Advocates of anticorruption awareness-raising hope that messages will motivate the 
public to get involved in the fight against corruption and/or reject opportunities to engage in 
corruption. Others have warned that if priming is the primary mechanism through which 
messages about corruption shape attitudes, however, anticorruption awareness-raising 
messages might actually backfire.4 This concern stems from research on so-called “corruption 
fatigue”, which is when a belief about corruption being a widespread problem gives way to 
                                                          
2 E.g. Berinsky et al. 2010; Carter, Ferguson, and Hassin 2011. 
3 Brody and Page 1972; Lenz 2009; Riker 1986. 
4 Peiffer and Alvarez 2016; Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2013. 
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scepticism that individual efforts spent on fighting or resisting corruption will be effective.5 
Along this vein, Peiffer and Alvarez show that a perception of widespread corruption is 
associated with unwillingness to protest corruption, report corruption to the authorities and pay 
more for a product produced by a company that has not engaged in corruption.6 Through this 
critical lens, if all messages about corruption or anticorruption—regardless of tone or content—
are priming the issue of widespread corruption, even a seemingly benign message informing 
people of how to get involved in the fight against corruption, for example, might backfire. This 
is because such a message would make more salient the issue of widespread corruption, and 
accordingly grow ‘corruption fatigue’. 
If perceptions are influenced because of persuasion, or learning, a message’s tone, 
content, and source could be extremely influential, by contrast. An expectation here, for 
example, is that a positively toned message will activate perceptions that are themselves 
positively charged.7 If tone matters, negative news coverage of high profile corruptions 
scandals might illicit a greater sense of ‘corruption fatigue’, but a persuasive positive message 
about how other citizens are successfully resisting corruption could inspire a greater sense of 
personal empowerment.  
The issue itself can be influential in determining which of these mechanisms might be 
at play. Research has shown that on issues that people have not thought much about, messages 
are more likely to influence attitudes through learning or persuasion.8 So, if someone had not 
previously considered reporting corruption and they learn that it is easy and safe to do so from 
a message, they may form a more positive perception of reporting. However, some have found 
that on issues that people tend to hold strong views on already, influential messages are more 
                                                          
5 Peiffer and Alvarez 2016. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Erisen, Lodge, and Taber 2014, 190. 
8 Lenz 2009. 
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likely to shape attitudes through priming.9  This is potentially bad news for anticorruption 
awareness-raising advocates; in many countries, corruption is a very common topic of 
conversation, which may reflect the fact that many people already hold strong (and negative) 
views about corruption. Therefore, messages about corruption and anticorruption may largely 
be priming the issue of widespread corruption, and as suggested earlier, such priming could be 
inspiring resignation, rather than indignation.  
Research on corruption messaging 
Only a handful of scholars have researched how messages about corruption influence 
attitudes and behaviour. Most studies in this vein examine how messages about corruption 
influence attitudes towards voting and voting patterns.10 Using experimental research designs, 
these studies tend to expose citizens to messages about a specific corruption scandal, and gauge 
whether that exposure provokes citizens to punish the implicated politicians at the polls. 
Corbacho et al.’s survey experiment in Costa Rica, by contrast, examined how exposure to 
messages about corruption influenced willingness to engage in corruption.11 They found that 
citizens exposed to a message about the increasing rate of co-nationals observing corruption 
were more willing to pay a bribe. 
Only one study to the author’s knowledge researched how messages influence 
perceptions of the corruption environment. Chong et al. examined whether information about 
mayoral corruption in Mexico influenced perceptions of corruption levels (as well as voter 
turnout).12 For the most part, Chong et al. finds that their treatment did not influence the degree 
to which people thought that the municipal government was dishonest.13 
                                                          
9 Carmine and Stimson 1989; Lenz 2009. 
10 Anduiza, Gallego and Munoz 2013; Chong, et al. 2015; Figueirdo, Hidalgo and Kasahara 
2011; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013. 
11 Corbacho et al 2016. 
12 Chong, et al. 2015 
13 Ibid. 
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In contrast, the present study exposes survey respondents to four different messages 
about corruption and examines how exposure to these messages influences perceptions of four 
different categories of perceptions, including perceptions of the level of corruption, 
consequences corruption has on development, government’s efforts in fighting corruption, and 
the extent to which an ordinary citizen can easily engage in anticorruption civic activity.14 This 
last perception might be most important. In Panth’s words, “citizens generally must believe 
that they can actually do something about corruption in order to summon the courage to act 
upon that belief.”15 
Method 
The analyses that follow uses data from an original survey-experiment conducted in 
Jakarta, Indonesia. Indonesia was a good case for this study for a few reasons. First, corruption 
is thought to be a considerable problem there. Of the 167 countries Transparency 
International’s 2016 Corruption Perception Index assesses, Indonesia is ranked in 88th place 
for its control of corruption, which is on par with Egypt and slightly worse than Liberia. 
Corruption is also not a socially taboo topic to discuss in Indonesia. Finally, the government’s 
Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) has led a very public, and by some accounts, 
successful fight against corruption. This final point was important to the interest this study had 
in testing what impact a message about the government’s success in fighting corruption had on 
perceptions. 
 The study ran from June 8th 2015 to July 7th 2015. One thousand participants were 
recruited. Working with the Regional Economic Development Institute, 100 villages in Jakarta 
were identified. In the aim of recruiting subjects from different socio-economic backgrounds, 
                                                          
14 The present study is not able to establish what mechanisms are at play. To establish how 
messages influence perceptions, analyses would require pre-treatment measures or a wave of 
data containing responses from the same respondents to questions gauging attitudes and 
knowledge about the issue before the present study was conducted. 
15 Panth 2011, 1. 
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thirty-five villages were relatively ‘low income’, forty-five were ‘middle income, fifteen were 
‘higher income’, and five were of a ‘very high income’. At the village level, ten households in 
each were selected by choosing every fifth household encountered by an enumerator, walking 
through the village. The sample was split evenly among males and females, its educational 
attainment distribution was similar to that of the nation, but the respondents are on average 
slightly younger than the average Indonesian. More details on the demographic characteristics 
of the sample are in an online appendix (A).  
Design 
Participants in the study were randomly assigned to one of five groups: control, grand 
corruption, petty corruption, government success, or civic engagement (n=200, each). 
Difference in means tests on basic demographic indicators revealed that there were no 
significant differences among the five groups with respect to the demographic data collected 
(online appendix B). Eleven professional enumerators, from the Regional Economic 
Development Institute, read a short introductory paragraph to the subjects that described the 
study’s aims as wanting to “learn what citizens think about public services and the experiences 
they have had with public officials.” It was explained that the responses to the questions on the 
survey would be treated confidentially, and that, if at any time they wanted to, the subject could 
stop answering the questions posed.  
The subjects were then asked basic socio-demographic questions. If assigned to the 
grand corruption, petty corruption, government success, or civic engagement groups, the 
demographic questions were followed by the respective treatment paragraphs (messages). 
After exposure to the treatment (or not for those in the control group, which proceeded 
immediately to the next set of questions), the subjects were asked questions gauging their 
perceptions (full instrument is available in online appendix C). 
Treatments 
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The grand corruption treatment mentioned scandals that have been the subject of front-
page news in Indonesia. The inspiration for this treatment comes from advice given in 2011 by 
the then Chief of Communication and Advocacy for the UNODC, Alun Jones.  He advised that 
awareness-raising efforts should call attention to the issue by publicising big corruption 
scandals.16 The treatment paragraph read: 
“Corruption continues to undermine the economy, the quality of services, and the 
capacity of the government to reduce poverty in this country. A recent report notes that 
‘never in Indonesian history have there been so many politicians imprisoned for 
corruption, often together with officials and businesspeople.’ Recent corruption cases 
include a former Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court taking billions of rupiahs in 
bribes and the Sport Minister being involved in a multi-billion rupiah corruption 
scandal.” 
The petty corruption treatment included statements meant to heighten awareness about 
the widespread prevalence of ‘local-level’ corruption. This treatment was included because 
‘local-level’ corruption is the type of corruption that ordinary people tend to have direct 
experiences with and ‘corruption fatigue’ is hypothesized as being triggered when people 
believe that their peers in society are engaging in corruption (not just elites). It read: 
“Corruption continues to undermine the economy, the quality of services, and the 
capacity of the government to reduce poverty in this country. Local-level corruption is 
considered to be widespread across all public services and agencies. According to a 
recent survey, 43 per cent of Indonesians have had to pay a bribe to a government official 
in the past year and 70 per cent believe that this type of corruption has increased in the 
last two years.” 
                                                          
16 Jones 2011. 
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The government success treatment made salient achievements made by the Indonesian 
government, and specifically the KPK, in fighting corruption. It was tested because Peiffer and 
Alvarez found that perceptions of government effectiveness in fighting corruption were 
positively associated with a greater willingness to fight corruption.17 It read:  
“The government has received praise from the international community for its recent 
successes in fighting corruption. The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), 
especially, has an impressive record of attacking corruption. Since the KPK was 
established it has arrested nearly 400 people on charges of corruption, and has achieved 
a 100% conviction rate.  In the first 6 months of 2014 the KPK recovered 2.8 trillion 
rupiah of stolen government money.” 
The civic engagement treatment included statements to emphasise the many things that 
citizens can do to join in the fight against corruption. It was included as an attempt to echo 
messages that some anticorruption campaigns publicise to try to encourage ordinary citizens to 
get involved. It read: 
“Now, more than ever before, ordinary citizens are finding it easy to get involved in the 
fight against corruption. If corruption is witnessed, ordinary citizens can either call or 
text the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK)’s 1575 corruption hotline, and those 
that do are guaranteed to remain anonymous and the information shared confidential. 
People have the right to access government information and last year the government 
launched an online data portal to make it even easier for the public to access government 
budgets and documents. Also, several vibrant anticorruption organisations exist across 
the country; citizens can get further involved by becoming a member of these 
organisations or attending their events, like the annual anticorruption week events or 
rallies held on International Anticorruption Day.” 
                                                          
17 Peiffer and Alvarez 2016. 
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Arguably, the petty corruption treatment is the most negative in tone. It mentions only 
statistics about the high levels of perceived and experienced bureaucratic corruption.  The 
grand corruption treatment focuses on negative corruption scandals, but also mentions the fact 
that several politicians have been imprisoned. The latter fact is a positive sign that the 
government is prosecuting this type of corruption. The government success treatment can 
similarly be taken both ways. It shines a positive light on the KPK’s efforts to control 
corruption, but also may make salient the negative facts that hundreds of people have been 
convicted and that a lot of money has been stolen. The civic engagement message is arguably 
the most positive because it does not mention the wide scale prevalence of any level of 
corruption.18 
Dependent variables 
Four categories of perceptions were scrutinized using six dependent variables. Table 1 
displays the exact wording of each perception question. Distribution figures of the responses 
to these questions are provided in an online appendix (D).  
Two dependent variables measure perceptions of corruption levels. The first uses 
responses to a question about how common corruption is amongst public officials and the 
second uses responses to a question about whether corruption levels have changed in the last 2 
years. The average respondent thought that corruption was common and that corruption levels 
had stayed the same.  
One dependent variable is used to measure concerns about how harmful corruption is 
to development. Two questions on the survey asked to what extent respondents are concerned 
over whether corruption—grand and petty corruption, respectively—is harming development 
in Indonesia. The average respondent expressed that they were ‘somewhat worried’ about the 
                                                          
18 The facts cited in the treatments were drawn from news reports or the results of Transparency 
International’s Global Corruption Barometer.  
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negative consequences of both types of corruption. As these questions were so similar and the 
responses were highly correlated (71 per cent), a single harm variable was created from the 
average response across these two questions.   
A further two dependent variables assess perceptions of the government’s efforts to 
fight corruption. One question asked about how proud respondents are of the government’s 
efforts to control corruption, and another asked for an opinion on whether the government is 
‘all talk but no action’ on the issue.  The average respondent was paradoxically somewhat 
proud of the government’s efforts and slightly agreed with the idea that the government was 
‘all talk’. 
The sixth dependent variable is based on a question that asked for an opinion about how 
easy it is for an ‘ordinary citizen’ to get involved in the fight against corruption. The average 
respondent agreed that it was easy to get involved. 
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Table 1: Dependent Variable Questions 
Perception Label Wording Response Options 
Levels 
Common 
Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption 
among public officials is… 
1 very uncommon to  
5 very common 
Increased Over the past 2 years how has the level of corruption in Indonesia changed? 
1 decreased a lot to  
5 increased a lot 
Consequences 
Grand harm 
How worried are you that grand corruption is harming development in Indonesia? 
By grand corruption, I mean corrupt acts involving large sums of money, 
committed by high profile public officials. 
1 not worried at all to 
4 very worried. 
Petty harm 
How worried are you that petty corruption is harming development in Indonesia? 
By petty corruption, I mean bribes paid by ordinary citizens and corrupt acts 
committed by local level public officials. 
1 not worried at all to 
4 very worried. 
Government’s 
Efforts 
Gov’t pride How proud are you with the government’s efforts to control corruption? 
1 not at all proud, to  
4 very proud. 
Gov’t talks 
How strongly do you disagree or agree with the following statement: there is much 
talk from the government about fighting corruption, but very little is done to 
actually reduce corruption? 
1 strongly disagree to 




How much do you agree with the following statement: it is now easier than ever 
for an ordinary citizen like me to report corruption or attend rallies against 
corruption? 
1 strongly disagree to 
5 strongly agree. 
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Estimation strategy  
Pair-wise difference in means (DIM) tests were conducted to determine whether and 
how exposure to the messages influenced perceptions.19 These analyses were used to test 
whether the mean responses to a dependent variable question, given by each group, is 
significantly different to the mean responses given by each of the other groups. A significant 
difference between mean responses indicates that exposure to the associated treatments had 
differential impacts on shaping the perception gauged. The use of DIM is appropriate when an 
assumption can be made that the only differences between the groups are that they received 
different treatments in the experiment. This assumption is made here because there were no 
significant differences found among the five groups to demographic questions posed at the 
beginning of the survey (online appendix B).  
Results 
Surprisingly, the DIM tests (Tables 2 and 3) show that, regardless of the different tones 
or contents of the treatments, all four messages have a strikingly similar impact on three 
dependent variables. Compared to the control group (‘treatments vs. controls’ in tables), all 
four treatment groups’ mean responses exhibited a statistically significantly greater degree of 
worry for the harm that corruption causes development in Indonesia, a lesser degree of pride 
in the government’s efforts, and lesser degree of confidence in the idea that it is easy to report 
and otherwise get involved in the fight against corruption.  
Further, the DIM between treatment groups shows that, for the most part, all four of the 
treatment messages influenced these three dependent variables to the same degree. Between 
                                                          
19 Regression analyses were also run. They included the following independent variables: a 
dummy variable representing each of the treatments (baseline is control group), age, gender, 
education and income level. Three of these regression models were insignificant (probability 
of Chi2 was greater than 0.10). The estimated influences of the treatments are similar in the 
significant regressions with what is reported here in the difference in means tests. The full 
regression results can be found in online appendix E. 
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treatment group pairings, there are no statistically significant differences in mean responses to 
the easy report question, only one statistically significant difference in mean responses to the 
government pride question (the mean response from civic engagement group is significantly 
higher than that of grand corruption’s group mean response, p-value: 0.096), and only two 
statistically significant differences in mean scores on the harm variable (the mean score from 
the civic engagement group is significantly lower than that of the grand corruption and petty 
corruption groups’ mean responses, p-value: 0.057 and p-value: 0.040, respectively).20  
 In contrast, exposure to the messages did not significantly shape the perceptions of 
levels of corruption. Table 2 shows that there are no statistically significant differences between 
the mean responses of the treatment groups and the control group to the two corruption levels 
dependent variable questions. 
 Finally, Table 3’s results also show that exposure to only the petty corruption message 
caused respondents to be more sceptical of the government’s efforts in fighting corruption. 
Respondents exposed to this treatment were in greater agreement with the idea that the 
government is ‘all talk but no action’ on anticorruption, than those in the control group, grand 
corruption group, and government success group.  Though, there was not a statistically 
significant difference between the mean response given to this question by those in the civic 
engagement and petty corruption treatment groups.  
 
                                                          
20 The lack of differences detected across treatment conditions may be due to all respondents 
being asked several questions about corruption, and therefore the idea of widespread corruption 
was reinforced universally, across the sample.   
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Treatments M SE  M SE  M SE  
Grand 4.07 0.06  3.41 0.08  3.37 0.04  
Petty 4.19 0.05  3.47 0.08  3.38 0.05  
Gov’t 4.19 0.05  3.23 0.08  3.32 0.05  
Civic 4.10 0.05  3.42 0.08  3.23 0.05  
Control 4.18 0.05  3.39 0.08  3.12 0.06  
Difference in Means Tests 
 C SE PV C SE PV C SE PV 
Treatments vs. Control          
   Grand vs. Control -0.11 0.07 0.132 0.02 0.11 0.891 0.26 0.07 0.000 
   Petty vs. Control -0.00 0.07 0.956 0.08 0.11 0.478 0.27 0.07 0.000 
   Gov’t vs. Control 0.01 0.07 0.935 -0.16 0.11 0.145 0.21 0.07 0.004 
   Civic vs. Control -0.09 0.07 0.246 0.02 0.11 0.841 0.12 0.07 0.096 
Between Treatments          
   Grand vs. Petty -0.12 0.07 0.117 -0.06 0.11 0.567 -0.01 0.07 0.882 
   Grand vs. Gov’t -0.12 0.07 0.113 0.18 0.11 0.111 0.05 0.07 0.485 
   Grand vs. Civic -0.03 0.07 0.729 -0.01 0.11 0.949 0.14 0.07 0.057 
   Petty vs. Gov’t -0.00 0.07 0.980 0.24 0.11 0.030 0.06 0.07 0.397 
   Petty vs. Civic 0.09 0.07 0.223 0.06 0.11 0.612 0.15 0.07 0.040 
   Gov’t vs. Civic 0.09 0.07 0.215 -0.18 0.11 0.097 0.09 0.07 0.231 



























Table 3: Pairwise Difference in Means for Gov’t Efforts and Civic Involvement 
variables 
Means 






Treatments M SE  M SE  M SE  
Grand 2.16 0.06  3.50 0.06  3.71 0.05  
Petty 2.18 0.06  3.65 0.06  3.63 0.07  
Gov’t 2.30 0.07  3.45 0.07  3.71 0.06  
Civic 2.30 0.06  3.54 0.06  3.65 0.06  
Control 2.92 0.05  3.47 0.06  3.85 0.05  
Difference in Means Tests 
 C SE PV C SE PV C SE PV 
Treatments vs. Control          
   Grand vs. Control -0.76 0.09 0.000 0.03 0.09 0.712 -0.15 0.08 0.071 
   Petty vs. Control -0.74 0.08 0.000 0.18 0.09 0.039 -0.22 0.08 0.006 
   Gov’t vs. Control -0.62 0.08 0.000 -0.02 0.09 0.844 -0.14 0.08 0.084 
   Civic vs. Control -0.62 0.09 0.000 0.07 0.09 0.428 -0.20 0.08 0.016 
Between Treatments          
   Grand vs. Petty -0.02 0.09 0.837 -0.15 0.09 0.090 0.08 0.08 0.347 
   Grand vs. Gov’t -0.13 0.09 0.116 0.05 0.09 0.572 -0.01 0.08 0.944 
   Grand vs. Civic -0.14 0.09 0.096 -0.04 0.09 0.673 0.05 0.08 0.533 
   Petty vs. Gov’t -0.12 0.08 0.170 0.20 0.09 0.024 -0.08 0.08 0.314 
   Petty vs. Civic -0.12 0.09 0.144 0.11 0.09 0.201 -0.03 0.08 0.752 
   Gov’t vs. Civic -0.01 0.09 0.924 -0.09 0.09 0.322 0.06 0.08 0.490 
M: Mean; C: Contrast; SE: Standard error; PV: P-value 
 
Discussion & Conclusion 
The results of this study suggests that very different messages about corruption 
and anticorruption can shape attitudes about the corruption environment in 
surprisingly similar ways. When influential, all messages tested heightened worries 
about the ill effects corruption has on development, depressed pride in the 
government’s fight against corruption, and reduced the extent to which people thought 
it is easy for ordinary people to fight corruption. These results give credence to the 
concern that awareness raising efforts might be backfiring because they are evoking 
‘corruption-fatigue’-like attitudes.21 These results are most remarkable with respect to 
the impact of the government success and civic engagement treatments. These 
                                                          
21 Peiffer and Alvarez 2016; Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2013. 
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messages were crafted with the intent to do the opposite—highlight successes the 
government has had in fighting corruption and make the case that citizens should find 
it easy to get involved, respectively.  
While surprising, the negative perceptions triggered are not necessarily 
unexplainable. Research on priming shows that if a positively toned message 
inadvertently primes a negative issue, the message can prompt people to think more 
negatively about the issue.  Relatedly, others have shown that people tend to discount 
information that disagrees with certain perceptions that they have already formed.22 
Taken together, this means that a ‘positive’ message about anticorruption may be 
dismissed, or by priming the issue of widespread corruption, the message may make 
people feel worse about how much more the government needs to do or could be 
doing.   
In contrast, none of the messages shaped beliefs about how corrupt the 
government is. Perhaps this is because beliefs about corruption levels are fairly stable. 
These findings warn that awareness raising campaigns hoping to shape these beliefs 
may be ineffective. In reflecting on similar findings in their study, Chong et al. suggest 
that messages about corruption confirm, rather than change, pre-existing beliefs about 
how prevalent corruption is.23 This may be why the grand corruption and petty 
corruption treatments, which explicitly described levels of different types of 
corruption, were not influential. The other two messages—government success and 
civic engagement—on the other hand, may not have shaped perceptions of levels 
because they did not as directly address how prevalent corruption is.  
                                                          
22 E.g. Taber and Lodge 2006 
23 Chong et al. 2015, 64. 
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Much can be done to build upon this research. Future research should examine 
the extent to which these findings are generalizable, beyond Jakarta, and beyond the 
context of a survey-experiment. Similar studies could also examine whether repeated 
or prolonged exposure to messaging influences perceptions in intended (or unintended 
ways). Finally, more can be done to gauge the extent to which messages impact 
anticorruption civic action or the proclivity to refuse to engage in corruption. Such 
research would investigate what linkages exist between messages, perceptions, and 
actions, on the ground. 
The many limitations of this study mean that the findings should not be read 
as a definitive statement about the effectiveness of anti-corruption awareness 
campaigns. Instead, the results express a modest warning that awareness raising efforts 
may risk triggering or building upon a growing sense of resignation. If future research 
shows that the findings presented here are generalizable, awareness-raising advocates 
should radically reconsider their approach to getting citizens more involved. Such 
research would show that, worse than wasting resources, awareness raising efforts 
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